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ABSTRACT
Wheneverrationalagentsformcoalitionstoexecutetasks, doingsoviaade-
centralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may
lead to a loss of efﬁciency compared to a centralized solution. To quantify
this loss, we introduce the notion of the Price of Democracy (PoD), which
measures the amount of resources needlessly committed to the task(s) at
hand. After deﬁning this concept for general coalitional games, we instan-
tiate it in the setting of weighted voting games, a simple but expressive
class of coalitional games that can be used to model resource allocation in
multiagent scenarios. We approach the problem of forming winning coali-
tions in this setting from a non-cooperative perspective, and put forward an
intuitive deterministic bargaining process, which exhibits no delay of agree-
ment (i.e., the agents are guaranteed to form a winning coalition in round
one) and allows for efﬁcient computation of bargaining strategies. We show
a tight bound of 3/2 on the PoD of our process if two rounds of bargain-
ing are allowed, and demonstrate that this bound cannot improve with more
rounds. We then generalize our bargaining process to settings where mul-
tiple coalitions are allowed to be formed, show that this generalization also
exhibits no delay of agreement, and discuss the PoD in such settings.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: [multiagent systems]
General Terms
Economics, Measurement, Theory
Keywords
game theory, coalition formation, multilateral bargaining
1. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games [19] provide a rich framework for the study of
cooperation in economics and social sciences, and have also been
used widely to model collaboration in multiagent systems (see,
e.g., [24, 4, 12]). In such games, rational agents come together into
teams (or coalitions) to achieve a common goal, and derive individ-
ual gains from this activity. Therefore, the study of processes that
enable such agents to form coalitions is a matter of great interest.
In particular, an important research goal is to design robust coali-
tion formation processes which take into account the opinions of all
individuals involved, and are at the same time beneﬁcial from the
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broader society’s perspective. Decentralized negotiation processes
to form coalitions are natural candidates to achieve this goal.
Consider for example a “Request for Proposals” domain similar
to the one presented in [12]. In this domain, as is frequently the
case in multiagent systems, there are tasks that await service, and
autonomousagentsthatpossessresourcesandhavetocomeupwith
proposals to form coalitions to fulﬁll these tasks. A coalition that
is successful in its application is then awarded a payment for the
effective completion of its task.
Clearly, several interesting questions arise in decentralized set-
tings such as the one above. First, one can ask which coalitions
are most likely to form and how will the agents in these coalitions
distribute the payoff obtained by fulﬁlling the task. Another impor-
tant issue is how long it will take the agents to form a successful
coalition. Finally, a natural parameter of interest is the total amount
of resources contributed by the members of winning coalitions. In-
deed, from the system designer’s perspective, it is desirable that the
most resource-efﬁcient solution is chosen, i.e., a coalition that can
perform a task using the minimal amount of resources should be
awarded the contract. However, in the absence of an all-powerful
autocratic center, one cannot just handpick the coalitions expend-
ing the minimal amount of resources. Therefore, when agents are
selﬁshly maximizing their own utility, there is likely to be a price
to pay in terms of resource efﬁciency.
In this paper, inspired by the existing work on the price of an-
archy pioneered by [11], we propose a concept to substantiate this
relative (in)efﬁciency of coalitions formed by self-interested agents
via a decentralized coalition formation approach. In such settings,
a coalition cannot form unless it is acceptable to everyone involved,
so the decisions to form coalitions are made democratically. There-
fore, we call this concept the price of democracy (PoD). Intuitively,
it compares the value and the cost of outcomes of a coalition for-
mation process to those of an optimal solution. Our deﬁnition is
applicable both in the case where there is only one coalition to be
formed, and in the multiple-coalition scenario.
To illustrate our general framework, we then proceed to study
this concept, as well as the rest of the questions above, in the con-
text of weighted voting games (WVGs) [26], a simple but expres-
sive class of coalitional games. In these games, each agent has a
weight, and a coalition wins if its members’ total weight meets a
given threshold. Weighted voting games have many applications,
but in this context are perhaps most useful for modelling resource
allocation in multi-agent systems: an agent’s weight can be thought
of as the amount of resources available to him, and the threshold in-
dicates the amount of resources required to achieve a task. Thus,
a winning coalition naturally corresponds to a team of agents that
can successfully cooperate to complete a given task.
The properties of various cooperative solutions for WVGs, suchas the Shapley value or the core, are well understood. However,
while these solutions describe which outcomes, i.e., coalitions and
payoff distribution schemes, are stable or fair, they do not explain
how these outcomes are likely to arise. Nevertheless, this topic is
clearly important from a practical point of view: coalitions do not
arise in a vacuum, but are usually the result of some negotiation
process among the agents involved. Despite this fact, to date, very
few papers have studied coalition formation processes, such as e.g.,
bargaining, in these games, and, moreover, the existing approaches
do not seem to be adequate for our resource allocation scenario (for
a more detailed discussion of the related work, see Section 2).
Against this background, we explore the non-cooperative ap-
proach to coalition formation in weighted voting games. We ﬁrst
focus on the case where there is only one task to be executed. For
this scenario, we propose and justify a bargaining process that the
agents can use in order to form a winning coalition. This pro-
cess can be seen as an extensive-form game, and therefore a nat-
ural solution concept for it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE). We then show that our bargaining process always pos-
sesses an efﬁciently computable SPNE. Moreover, any “reason-
able”SPNEofthisprocess(includingtheonethatcanbeefﬁciently
computed) exhibits no delay of agreement; that is, even though
there can be several rounds of negotiation, the outcome proposed in
the ﬁrst round is accepted. Taken together, these two results imply
that under this bargaining process, the agents can quickly arrive to
an acceptable outcome.
We then study the price of democracy of this bargaining process.
We instantiate our generic PoD concept in this domain and demon-
strate that for a wide range of parameters of this process its PoD
is tighly bounded by 2 if there is only one round of bargaining,
and by 3/2 if two rounds of bargaining are allowed. Interestingly,
this bound cannot be improved by adding more rounds. The afore-
mentioned bounds mean that agents may commit twice as much re-
sources as necessary if they can only use one round of bargaining;
however, adding just one more round cuts the amount of resources
overcommitted to the task by half. Note that even with two rounds
of bargaining available, the negotiation will terminate in the ﬁrst
round: intuitively, it is the threat of the ﬁrst offer being rejected that
makes the ﬁrst proposer suggest a more reasonable—and therefore
more efﬁcient—outcome. In other words, the increase in resource
efﬁciency from adding an extra round does not cause any actual
loss in time efﬁciency.
Finally, we generalize our approach to the case where there is
more than one task to be executed, and thus multiple coalitions to
beformed, extendthedescriptionandtheanalysisofourbargaining
process to this setting, and discuss its PoD.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A coalitional game with transferable utility G = (N,v) is given
by (i) a set of agents (or players) N = {1,...,n} and (ii) a char-
acteristic function v : 2
N 7→ R that speciﬁes the value v(C) of
each coalition C ⊆ N [19]. Intuitively, v(C) represents the max-
imal payoff the members of C can jointly receive by cooperating.
A coalitional game is simple if v(C) ∈ {0,1} for any C ⊆ N.
Aweightedvotinggame(WVG)isacoalitionalgameGgivenby
a set of agents N = {1,...,n}, their weights w = (w1,...,wn),
wi ∈ R
+, and a threshold T ∈ R
+; we write G = (N;w;T).
We use w(C) to denote
P
i∈C wi; we also use similar notation for
othern-dimensionalvectorsconsideredinthepaper. Foracoalition
C ⊆ N, its value v(C) is 1 if w(C) ≥ T; otherwise, v(C) = 0.
Without loss of generality, let the value of the grand coalition N be
1 (i.e., w(N) ≥ T). Throughout, we assume for simplicity that the
weights are normalized, i.e., w1 + ··· + wn = 1.
A thorough discussion of weighted voting games can be found
in [26]. From an algorithmic perspective, the problem of comput-
ing various cooperative solution concepts for WVGs without coali-
tion structures, such as Shapley–Shubik power index [25], Banzhaf
power index [2], and the core and other stability-related solution
concepts is quite well studied [16, 15, 22, 8]. Also, Elkind et
al. [7] have recently introduced weighted voting games with coali-
tionstructures(i.e., WVGsinwhich, unlikeinthetraditionalmodel,
several winning coalitions can form simultaneously) and examined
the coalitional stability of such games. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the only paper that examines non-cooperative aspects
of weighted voting is [10]. Moreover, the model in [10] differs
from the one we put forward in several important ways, e.g., in [10]
agents outside the proposed coalition may also be allocated a share
of the total payoff, and have the power to reject a proposal. Clearly,
the latter requirement would be very counterintuitive in multi-agent
resource allocation domains.
On the other hand, coalitional bargaining in generic coalitional
gameshasbeenthefocusofagrowingcorpusofresearch[5, 18, 20,
27]. However, the focus of these papers is usually on the existence
of an equilibrium rather than its algorithmic properties. Indeed, in
some of these papers the proofs are non-constructive, thus provid-
ing very little insight into the structure of the equilibria. Moreover,
unlike in our work, many of these results rely on discounting and/or
the random order of proposers to show no delay of agreement.
Finally, the notion of the price of anarchy was introduced by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in their seminal paper [11] in the
context of congestion games. In that paper, it is deﬁned as the ratio
of the social welfare in a worst-case Nash equilibrium to that in an
optimal solution. Subsequently, Anshelevich et al. [1] introduced
the complementary notion of the price of stability, which compares
the performance of the best Nash equilibrium to that of the optimal
solution. Providing bounds on both of these quantities for various
classes of games has been an active stream of research in recent
years [6, 23], and has inspired our work on the price of democracy
in this paper. However, these concepts were traditionally applied
to non-cooperative games and Nash equilibria of those games. In
contrast, our concept of the price of democracy, which we will now
deﬁne, is applicable to coalitional games and is not tightly linked
to equilibria. Hence, it can be used to measure the efﬁciency of
both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions of such games.
3. THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY
In this section, we introduce the notion of the price of democracy
for coalition formation. Our goal is to be able to compare the coali-
tion structure that emerges as the outcome of a “democratic” coali-
tion formation (e.g., bargaining) process to the “optimal” coalition
structure, which can be selected in a centralized manner. The im-
portant advantage of a negotiation procedure over a centralized so-
lution is that it does not assume the existence of a trusted center,
and, furthermore, the resulting outcome must be acceptable to all
players involved. However, ﬁnding a solution that is broadly ac-
ceptable to the players may naturally lead to a loss of efﬁciency.
Our goal here is to quantify this loss.
To build up intuition, we will ﬁrst consider coalition formation
processes that result in a single coalition. Let GN be the set of all
coalitional games with the set of players N, and let B : GN → 2
N
be a coalition formation process that takes a coalitional game as
an input and outputs a coalition CB ⊆ N. For now, to simplify
the exposition, we assume that the output of B is unique: later,
we will relax this assumption. A straightforward approach would
be to compare the value of the coalition CB that emerges in B to
vmax = max{v(C) | C ⊆ N}. While natural in many settings,this approach ignores the issue of overcommitting resources. For
example, in simple games, this approach will not be able to distin-
guish between processes that form a minimal winning coalition and
ones that end up forming the grand coalition. Now, in multiagent
systems resource efﬁciency is often an important consideration; so
we need a more ﬁne-grained approach, which will allow us to pe-
nalize coalition formation processes that form redundant coalitions.
To formally capture this notion of redundancy, we assume that
we are given a cost vector c = (c1,...,cn). The entries of this
vector reﬂect the cost of employing the players. For example, one
can set ci = 1 for all i = 1,...,n: this will have the effect of pre-
ferring minimal coalitions over non-minimal ones. Alternatively,
if the game involves contributing resources to a coalition, one can
set ci = ri, where ri is the amount of resources available to player
i. Now, for each coalition we have two parameters: its value v(C)
and its cost c(C) =
P
i∈C ci. Given this, we can measure the ef-
ﬁciency e(C) of each coalition by setting e(C) =
v(C)
c(C). Then, let
emax = maxC⊆N e(C). Using this notation, one can deﬁne the
price of democracy of a coalitional bargaining process B on G as
PoD(B,G) = emax/e(CB) (1)
However, while this approach may be natural in some settings, in
many multi-agent resource allocation domains achieving the high-
est possible value is paramount, and costs are of secondary impor-
tance. In this case, it is more natural to use a two-tiered approach,
i.e., deﬁne PoD(B,G) as
PoD(B,G) =

+∞ if v(CB) 6= vmax
c(CB)
cmin otherwise, (2)
where cmin = min{c(C) | v(C) = vmax}. This deﬁnition as-
signs a price of democracy of +∞ to any process that does not
produce a coalition with the maximal value. Note that for sim-
ple games (and, in particular, WVGs discussed in the next section)
both approaches (the efﬁciency-based and the value-maximizing)
are equivalent. However, as we will now see, this is not the case for
games with multiple coalitions—even ones based on simple games.
We now consider coalition formation processes whose outputs
may consist of more than one coalition. Formally, we say that
CS = (C1,...,Ck) is a coalition structure for N if Ci ⊆ N,
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for any i,j = 1,...,k, and ∪
k
i=1Ci = N. In
many games, there are restrictions on admissible coalition struc-
tures: e.g., coalition structures with more than a ﬁxed number of
coalitions or containing coalitions that exceed a certain size are im-
possible. To formalize this, we assume that, together with a game
G with the set of players N, we are given a set of admissible coali-
tion structures over N, denoted by CSN. We are now interested in
coalition formation processes of the form B : GN → CSN.
We can straightforwardly extend the notions of cost and value
to coalition structures by setting c(CS) =
P
Ci∈CS c(Ci) and
v(CS) =
P
Ci∈CS v(Ci) and deﬁne vmax, emax and cmin accord-
ingly. Observe, however, that in this setting—even if the underly-
inggameissimpleandeveryformedcoalitionhasavalueof1—the
most efﬁcient coalition structure need not be the one with the max-
imal value: indeed, a coalition structure with 2 coalitions of cost
1 each is more efﬁcient than a coalition structure with 5 coalitions
whose costs are 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The efﬁciency-based deﬁnition
is more appropriate if we are interested in the average efﬁciency
of the coalitions formed. However, as argued above, in a typical
multi-agent task allocation scenario, maximizing the total number
of the tasks completed often has a higher priority than minimiz-
ing the resource usage. We therefore deﬁne the price of democracy
(PoD) as follows:
DEFINITION 1. Given a game G = (N,v), a set of admissible
coalition structures CSN, and a coalition formation process B, the
price of democracy of B with respect to a game G is given by
PoD(B,G) =

+∞ if v(CSB) 6= vmax
c(CSB)
cmin otherwise, (3)
where CSB is the coalition structure output by the coalition for-
mation process B, vmax = max{v(CS) | CS ∈ CSN} and
cmin = min{c(CS) | CS ∈ CSN,v(CS) = vmax}.
This deﬁnition also captures the case of a single coalition: indeed,
we can deﬁne admissible coalition structures as ones that can con-
tain at most one non-singleton coalition.
Extensions First, if the coalition formation process B can output
more than one coalition (e.g., it is a bargaining process with mul-
tiple equilibria), we can deﬁne the pessimistic/optimistic price of
democracy as the maximal/minimal value of PoD, over all possi-
ble outputs of B. This distinction is reminiscent of that between
the price of anarchy and the price of stability in non-cooperative
games, as discussed in Section 2. In what follows, we focus on the
pessimistic variant (which we refer to as “the price of democracy”
from now on), as it allows us to quantify the worst-case loss in ef-
ﬁciency and therefore provides reliable performance guarantees in
realistic scenarios.
Second, Deﬁnition 1 deals with the price of democracy of a ﬁxed
coalition formation process with respect to a ﬁxed game. However,
one can also deﬁne the price of democracy of a process with respect
to a certain class of games by taking the maximal value of the PoD
of this process over all games in this class. For instance, in what
follows we bound the PoD of the bargaining process proposed in
Section 4 with respect to the class of all weighted voting games,
rather than compute it for individual games. Clearly, such bounds
are important as they allow us to estimate the performance of a
coalition formationprocess before we know thedetails of the game.
Finally, we can easily incorporate time discounting and stochas-
ticity in our model. Due to space constraints, we postpone this
discussion to an extended version of this paper.
4. ACOALITIONALBARGAININGPROCESS
We now put forward an intuitive bargaining process for coalition
formation in WVG environments. The process is motivated by
realistic considerations and requirements prevalent in multiagent
settings such as the “Request for Proposals” domain presented in
Section 1. In particular, since in such domains there is a need to
guarantee the allocation and execution of a task in a timely fashion,
it is natural for any such formation process to last for a predeﬁned
ﬁnite number of rounds.
To formally introduce our process, consider a weighted voting
game G = (N;w;T), |N| = n. We can assume without loss
of generality that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ ··· ≥ wn. For any ﬁxed m,
consider the game that consists of m rounds. In the kth round,
k ≤ m, player k mod n proposes a coalition C
k and a pay-
off vector p
k = (p
k
1,...,p
k
n) that satisﬁes (i) p
k
i ≥ 0 for all
i = 1,...,n, (ii)
P
i∈N p
k
i = v(C
k) and (iii) p
k
i = 0 for all
i 6∈ C
k. Intuitively, p
k describes a way to distribute the value of
the coalition C
k between its members. Then all members of C
k
simultaneously and independently decide whether to accept this
proposal. If all of them accept, C
k is formed, everyone is paid
according to p
k and the game ends; otherwise, the game moves on
to the next round.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the case m ≤ n, i.e., each
player gets at most one chance to propose a coalition. This is anatural restriction, and it substantially simpliﬁes the analysis of the
agents’ strategic behavior. Observe also that we assume that the
agents make proposals in order of decreasing weight. This reﬂects
the fact that in most real-life scenarios the agents who have more
power/resources have an advantage during the bargaining process.
Bargaining processes with these properties are quite standard in the
economics literature
1.
We assume that each agent i has a reservation cost ε, which we
essentially consider as the incentive for the agents to participate
in the bargaining process.
2 The individual rationality then implies
that i will reject any offer in which his payoff pi is less than ε.
We think of the ε value as being relatively small; in particular, we
always assume ε < 1, and some (though not all) of our results
rely on ε ≤ 1/n. Furthermore, we assume that each agent can
participate in a winning coalition, i.e., for each agent i there is a
coalition C
∗
i that satisﬁes i ∈ C
∗
i , w(C
∗
i ) ≥ T, ε|C
∗
i | ≤ 1. The
agents are fully strategic, i.e., they know each other’s weights as
well as the number of rounds m, and choose their strategies so as
to optimize their overall utility from the game. Finally, we assume
that there is no discounting, but all agents prefer getting a payoff
p in the current round to getting the same payoff in a subsequent
round. Given a weighted voting game G = (N;w;T), reservation
cost ε, and a number of rounds m, we denote the corresponding
bargaining process by B(G,ε,m).
Clearly, the process B(G,ε,m) can be described as an extensive
form game of perfect information. The appropriate equilibrium so-
lution concept for such a game is the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equi-
librium (SPNE) [14]. Brieﬂy, a proﬁle of strategies is an SPNE if
it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the extensive
form game. Moreover, it is known that every ﬁnite game of perfect
information has a pure strategy SPNE.
5. NO DELAY OF AGREEMENT
We now show that B(G,ε,m) has several desirable properties.
Speciﬁcally, we show that: (i) B(G,ε,m) possesses an efﬁciently
computable SPNE; (ii) in this SPNE, the strategies of all players are
stationary—i.e., the proposal made in each round does not depend
on the details of the proposals rejected in the previous rounds; (iii)
any stationary SPNE of B(G,ε,m) exhibits no delay of agreement,
i.e., the coalition and the payoff division scheme proposed by the
ﬁrst player are accepted by all members of that coalition.
Westartbyformalizingthenotionofastationarystrategy. Namely,
we say a strategy of player j is stationary if the outcome he pro-
poses in the jth round is the same no matter what coalitions and
payoff division schemes were proposed by players 1,...,j − 1
(observe that if the game has proceeded to the jth round, it means
that the proposals made in the previous rounds were rejected). An
SPNE is stationary if the strategy of each player in this SPNE is
stationary. Focusing on such equilibria—henceforth, SSPEs—is a
standard approach in the multilateral bargaining literature [17, 21,
5, 20], since stationarity provides a natural and realistic way to nar-
1Of course, such an ordering would be impossible to impose in
environments with unknown opponents’ weights. Different de-
centralized bargaining processes, requiring a random order of pro-
posers, would be required in such settings. However, we limit our
study here to problems with perfect information regarding oppo-
nent weights, as is the norm in the WVGs literature.
2The ε reservation cost is not to be confused with the notion of
the reservation value (the value of an agent’s singleton coalition)
in generic coalitional games, nor does it represent the “complete
costs” sustained by an agent for serving a task—these “complete
costs”, in fact, correspond to the resources expended by the agents
(i.e., the agents’ weights).
row the set of proposals that occur in equilibrium. We are now
ready to state our main result.
THEOREM 1. The bargaining process B(G,ε,m) described in
Section 4 has an SSPE. Moreover, in any SSPE of this process there
is no delay of agreement. Finally, suppose that for i = 1,...,n we
can represent wi as wi = w
0
i/W, where all w
0
i and W are integers.
Then we can compute an SSPE in time poly(n,logW).
PROOF. The proof is by backwards induction. We inductively
construct a particular SSPE (s1,...,sn) of our process; at step j,
j = m,...,1, we specify the proposal that player j makes under
sj, and argue that it can be computed within poly(n,logW) steps.
Furthermore, weshowthatinanSSPE,ifplayerj makesaproposal
(C,p) that is accepted, then p satisﬁes pi = ε for all i ∈ C, i < j.
Finally, we show that in any SSPE, the proposal made by player
j in round j is accepted by all players in the proposed coalition.
Applying the latter result with k = 1 implies that there is no delay
of agreement in an SSPE.
First consider the case j = m. It is clear that m prefers mak-
ing an acceptable proposal to one that will be rejected. Moreover,
any player invited by m will accept the offer as long as he is of-
fered at least ε. Therefore, in equilibrium m will offer exactly ε to
every player he invites. Consequently, he can maximize his proﬁt
by inviting as few players as possible. This can be achieved by
a greedy strategy: m invites 1,...,km, where km = min{k | P
i=1,...,k,i6=m wi + wm ≥ T}. Note that the size of the resulting
coalition C
m is at most the size of C
∗
m (for deﬁnition of C
∗
m, see
Section 4), so under this proposal m makes positive proﬁt. Note
that C
m is not the only proposal m can make as a part of an SSPE
strategy, but any proposal (C,p) that m can make in an SSPE sat-
isﬁes |C| = |C
m|, pi = ε for i ∈ C. We can now partially specify
sm by stipulating that m selects C
m greedily and offers ε to any
i ∈ C
m; in the end, we will complete the description of the strat-
egy sm by explaining which proposals m would accept at each of
the rounds 1,...,m − 1.
Now, suppose that the statement has been proved for all k, j <
k ≤ m, and consider the problem faced by agent j in round j.
Fix an SSPE of the bargaining process, and consider the proposal
(C
j+1,p
j+1) that j + 1 makes in the (j + 1)st round under this
SSPE (as this equilibrium is stationary, this proposal is independent
of the one that j is about to make). If this proposal includes j, then
he can make an acceptable proposal by proposing (C
j+1,p
j+1)
himself. Indeed, by inductive assumption, (C
j+1,p
j+1) is ac-
ceptedinroundj+1, soitsatisﬁesindividualrationality. Moreover,
if any agent i ∈ C
j+1 rejects this proposal in round j, the game
will proceed to round j+1, where this proposal would be accepted
and i will receive the same payoff that is currently offered, a con-
tradiction. On the other hand, if j 6∈ C
j+1, then j can propose
coalition C
0 = C
j+1 \{j + 1}∪ {j}, and a payoff vector p
0 such
that p
0
i = p
j+1
i for all i 6= j,j + 1 and p
0
j = p
j+1
j+1, p
0
j+1 = 0.
As wj ≥ wj+1, we have w(C
0) ≥ T. On the other hand, as
ε ≤ p
j+1
j+1 = p
0
j, this proposal is individually rational. Moreover,
by the same argument as in the previous case, all agents in C
0 will
accept this proposal. We conclude that j can always make a pro-
posal that is accepted and guarantees him at least ε. Moreover, he
weakly prefers making such a proposal to one that is rejected. In-
deed, by our inductive assumption, if j’s proposal is rejected, then
the game will proceed to the next round, where player j + 1 will
make a proposal; this proposal will be accepted and the game will
stop. Then, by our inductive assumption, player j will receive at
most ε under (j + 1)’s proposal.
Now, suppose that j is considering proposing (C,p) in the cur-
rent round. Clearly, C will have to satisfy j ∈ C, w(C) ≥ T,ε|C| ≤ 1. Now, for any agent i 6= j, i ∈ C, it has to be the
case that pi = max{ε,p
j+1
i }. Indeed, any offer of less than ε
will be rejected by any i ∈ C, and if i ∈ C
j+1 and he is offered
less than p
j+1
i in round j, he will reject the current proposal, as he
expects to get more in the next round. On the other hand, setting
pi > max{ε,p
j+1
i } is not a best response to agent (j + 1)’s strat-
egy: clearly, i will accepta payoff of max{ε,p
j+1
i } at thisstage, so
j can improve his own payoff by offering max{ε,p
j+1
i } to i. Note
that this implies that j will never offer to pay more than ε to any
i < j, as, by the inductive assumption, j+1 never does. Moreover,
it follows that the payment vector p is uniquely determined by the
choice of coalition C. Therefore, given the proposal made by j+1,
the proposal made by j can be determined by solving an instance
of the Knapsack problem, where the goal is to construct a coalition
of weight at least T and the smallest possible cost, where the costs
are given by max{ε,p
j+1
i }, i = 1,...,n. In particular, assum-
ing that in the (j + 1)st round j + 1 behaves according to sj+1
(recall that by our inductive assumption, the proposal that j + 1
should make under sj+1 has already been speciﬁed), we can de-
ﬁne j’s proposal under sj to be the lexicographically ﬁrst solution
to the corresponding instance of Knapsack. Now, by construction
it is easy to see that each p
j+1
i , i = 1,...,n, is of the form xε
or 1 − yε for some x,y that are polynomial in n, i.e., p
j+1
i can
take at most polynomially many different values. In such settings,
Knapsack can be solved within poly(n,logW) steps [13].
Now, to fully describe the strategy proﬁle (s1,...,sn), it re-
mains to specify how each player should react to the proposals
made in rounds 1,...,n. This is done as follows. Let (C
j,p
j)
be the proposal made by player j in round j under sj. Then in that
round player i 6= j should accept an invitation to join a coalition
C
j if he is offered at least max{p
j+1
i ,ε}. It is easy to see that this
strategy proﬁle is indeed an SSPE.
We can extend our result to the case when the agents’ reservation
costs may differ, i.e., the reservation cost of agent i is given by εi.
We still assume that each agent can form a winning coalition, i.e.,
for each i there exists a C, i ∈ C, such that ε(C) ≤ 1. In this
model, we show that there is no delay of agreement if either (i)
all εi are sufﬁciently small or (ii) the sequence ε1,...,εn is non-
decreasing; moreover, these assumptions appear to be necessary.
We conclude this section by stating some SSPE strategies’ prop-
erties which follow directly from the proof of Theorem 1, and will
be useful for the analysis presented in the next section.
PROPOSITION 1. If a proposer j makes a proposal (C,p) that
is accepted, then p satisﬁes: (i) pi = ε for all i ∈ C, i < j and
(ii) |{i ∈ C|pi > ε}| ≤ 1. Moreover, in any SSPE of B(G,ε,m),
each player’s decision whether to accept a proposal made in the
current round only depends on the payment offered to this player
(and not on the payments offered to others in this round).
6. THEPRICEOFDEMOCRACYINWVGS
We now proceed to instantiate our generic price of democracy con-
cept in the weighted voting games setting. A natural measure of
(in)efﬁciency for a coalition formation process in this domain is
the amount of resources needlessly committed to the task at hand.
Hence, in this setting it is natural to identify the cost of the ith
player ci with his weight wi. Furthermore, we identify the out-
comes of our bargaining process with the set of its SSPEs: this ap-
proach is standard in the economic literature, as the non-stationary
SPNE are rather unnatural, and therefore unlikely to arise. By in-
stantiating Deﬁnition 1 in this setting, and taking into account the
multiplicity of SSPE of B, we obtain the following deﬁnition:
DEFINITION 2. Given a weighted voting game G = (N,w,T)
and the bargaining process B = B(G,ε,m) deﬁned above, the
price of democracy in G under B is deﬁned as
PoD(B,G) = max
C∈CEQ(B,G)
w(C)
wmin
, (4)
where wmin = min{w(C) | w(C) ≥ T} and CEQ(B,G) is the
set of all coalitions that can form in SSPE of B.
Observe that the case PoD = +∞ never arises here, since by The-
orem 1 a winning coalition always forms. Notice also that, since
bargaining equilibria are now considered, the PoD in this setting
can be viewed as an instantiation of the Price of Anarchy concept.
We can now evaluate the price of democracy of B(G,ε,m).
First, observe that unless we require wi < T for all i, no mean-
ingful bound on PoD(B,G) can be derived. Indeed, if this condi-
tion does not hold, it may happen that w1 = kT for some k > 1,
w2 = T (and the weights of all other agents are arbitrary). In this
case, agent 1 can propose the coalition that includes himself only,
resulting in PoD = k irrespective of the number of rounds. More-
over, in practice, it is often the case that no agent can achieve the
goal on his own, so this assumption is quite realistic. Therefore,
from now on, we assume that wi < T for i = 1,...,n. Further-
more, it is easy to see that in WVGs with n = 2 agents, the price
of democracy is equal to 1: both agents must be included in a win-
ning coalition, since none of them achieves T on its own. Thus,
henceforth we assume the existence of at least 3 agents.
For this setting, we consider the cases T > 1/2 and T ≤ 1/2
separately. In the former case, we show that, even though there is
no delay of agreement, the number of bargaining rounds is crucial:
if m = 1, we show a tight upper bound of 2, and if m > 1, we
show a tight upper bound of 3/2. For T ≤ 1/2, we show an upper
bound of 2 which is tight irrespective of the number of rounds.
Given a game G, ﬁx Copt ∈ argmin{w(C) | w(C) ≥ T}.
We start by proving a simple upper bound on PoD(B,G) for any
weighted voting game G.
LEMMA 1. For any WVG G and any C ∈ CEQ(B,G), we
have w(C) − w(Copt) ≤ w(C) − T < mini∈C wi.
Proof : Suppose otherwise and ﬁx C such that w(C) − T ≥
mini∈C wi and j ∈ argmini∈C wi. We have w(C) − wj ≥ T,
so C \ {j} is a winning coalition. Hence, instead of proposing C,
player 1 (the proposer) can invite players in C\{j} and offer to pay
them the same amount as they were getting in C. By Proposition 1,
this proposal will be accepted. On the other hand, this allows the
proposer to save at least ε, a contradiction. 2
COROLLARY 1. If a WVG G satisﬁes wi <
T
q for all i ∈ N
and some q ≥ 1, then PoD(B,G) ≤
1+q
q .
Indeed, we have
PoD(B,G) = max
C∈CEQ(B,G)
w(C)
w(Copt)
≤
w(Copt) + mini∈C wi
w(Copt)
= 1 +
mini∈C wi
w(Copt)
≤ 1 +
mini∈C wi
T
< 1 +
T/q
T
=
1 + q
q
.
Note that
1+q
q decreases in q. Thus, Corollary 1 essentially means
that if the weights of the agents are relatively small, then the price
of democracy is close to 1. In addition, by substituting q = 1 one
may conclude the following.
COROLLARY 2. For any WVG G we have PoD(B,G) ≤ 2.We are now ready to present our main results on PoD(B,G).
First, we consider the case T >
1
2. We show that the upper bound
of 2 is tight if only one bargaining round is allowed (see Example
1). For m ≥ 2, we prove a tight upper bound of
3
2 (Theorem 2).
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a WVG G with T >
1
2, m = 1, and
weights w1 = T − δ,w2 = T − 2δ,w3 = ... = wn =
3δ
n−2, for
some arbitrarily small δ > 0. To form a winning coalition, player
1 has to propose either to player 2 or to
n−2
3 players i > 2. Player
1 prefers to invite as few other players as possible, so proposes to
player 2. Player 2 accepts, since there will be no other opportunity
for him to get into a winning coalition; thus, the equilibrium out-
come is {1,2}. An optimal coalition, however, consists of player 2
and
2(n−2)
3 players i > 2, implying PoD(B,G) =
2T−3δ
T
− − →
δ→0 2.
If more than one round of bargaining is allowed, then player 2
has an opportunity to propose in the second round. Hence, in the
equilibrium outcome which is formed with no delay of agreement
(by Theorem 1, there exists one), player 1 has to pay player 2 at
least the amount the latter can guarantee to himself later on. Thus,
player 1 might consider to propose to
n−2
3 players i > 2 rather than
to 2. However, if ε, the minimum amount he has to offer to each
one of them, is large enough, such a coalition will not be formed.
For example, if ε >
3
n−2, then player 1 would have to pay the
players 3,...,n more than 1 in total, implying a negative payoff
for himself. Hence, for relatively large values of ε it can be the
case that PoD(B(G,ε,m),G) is close to 2 even for m > 1.
However, as discussed before, we interpret ε as a participation-
incentivizing reservation cost. Thus, in the context of our setting, it
is natural to assume that ε is sufﬁciently small. We will now derive
stronger bounds on the price of democracy under the assumption
ε ≤
1
n. In particular, we will show that under this assumption the
price of democracy can be signiﬁcantly reduced by allowing only
one additional round of bargaining. Moreover, one cannot achieve
a better result by allowing more than one additional rounds.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that ε ≤
1
n and G satisﬁes T >
1
2 and
m ≥ 2. Then PoD(B,G) is tightly bounded by
3
2.
Proof : Let C ∈ argmax{w(S) | S ∈ CEQ(B,G)}. By
Lemma 1, if C includes some i with wi ≤
T
2 , then PoD(B,G) =
w(C)
w(Copt) <
w(Copt)+mini∈C wi
w(Copt) ≤ 1 +
T/2
T =
3
2, as required.
On the other hand, if C only includes agents with wi >
T
2 , it
cannot contain any agent i ≥ 4, since wi ≤ w4 ≤
1
4 <
T
2 . Also
notice that C consists of only two agents. Indeed, otherwise we
have C = {1,2,3}. Since w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 >
T
2 , it follows that
any pair of agents from 1,2,3 can form a winning coalition; thus
the proposer would be able to increase his payoff by at least ε by
excluding one partner, a contradiction. Now, note that w({2,3}) ≤
w({1,3}) ≤ w({1,2}) and, by Theorem 1, there exists an SSPE
with no delay of agreement. Thus C is either {1,2} or {1,3}, and
it forms in the ﬁrst round of bargaining.
Consider ﬁrst the case of C = {1,2}. Here player 1 has to pay
player 2 at least 1 − ε since any other offer will be rejected by 2
(as he can guarantee to himself a payoff of 1 − ε in the second
round by offering ε to player 1 who would obviously accept). Note
also that any other player i > 2 would accept from player 1 any
offer of pi ≥ ε (since player 2, if he gets to propose in the second
round, will not invite i at all). Now, since ε ≤
1
n, we have that
(n − 2)ε ≤
n−2
n ≤ 1 − 2ε. Hence, by replacing player 2 with a
subset of N\{1,2}, player 1 could increase his payoff by at least ε.
Hence, the only reason for player 1 to invite player 2 is that player
2 is a veto player, i.e., w(N \ {2}) < T. Then, it is also the case
that w(N \ {1}) < T. Therefore, Copt = C = {1,2}, implying
PoD(B,G) = 1.
Consider now the case of C = {1,3}. If both agents 1 and 3
belong to Copt, then Copt = {1,3} and PoD(B,G) = 1. If none
of them is in Copt, then w(N \{1,3}) ≥ w(Copt) ≥ T, implying
w1+w3 < T, in contradiction to {1,3} being a winning coalition.
So, assume |C ∩ Copt| = 1.
Recall that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 >
T
2 yields w2 +w3 > T, implying
w(N \ {2,3}) < T. Hence, if a winning coalition contains only
one of the agents 1 and 3, it must include agent 2 as well. Thus,
since {2,3} is a winning coalition and w2 + w3 ≤ w1 + w2, we
conclude that Copt = {2,3}. We complete the proof by showing
that PoD(B,G) =
w1+w3
w2+w3 ≤
3
2.
Assume this is not the case. Then,
w1 + w3
w2 + w3
>
3
2
⇒ w1 −
3
2
w2 >
1
2
w3 >
T
4
. (5)
On the other hand,
w3 >
T
2
and
X
i∈N
wi = 1 ⇒ w1+w2 < 1−
T
2
⇒ w1 < 1−
T
2
−w2.
(6)
Now, (5)coupledwith(6)implies1−
T
2 −w2−
3
2w2 >
T
4 ⇒ w2 <
4−3T
10 , which, by w2 > T/2, implies T < 1/2, a contradiction.
To show that this bound is tight, consider the following exam-
ple. Let w1 = T − 4δ, w2 =
T
2 + 2δ, w3 =
T
2 + δ, and
w4 = ... = wn =
δ
n−3 (for n = 3, set w1 = T − 3δ). Re-
gardless of the number of rounds allowed, there is an equilibrium
outcome consisting of either players 1 and 2 or players 1 and 3.
The optimal winning coalition is obviously given by {2,3}. Thus,
PoD(B,G) ≥
3
2T−3δ
T+3δ
− − →
δ→0
3
2. 2
We now discuss the complementary case of T ≤
1
2. In this case,
the upper bound of 3/2 no longer holds. Indeed, we will now show
that when T is small, the price of democracy can be arbitrarily
close to 2 even with many rounds of bargaining. We present the
construction for the case T ≥
1
n−1. Observe that it is always the
case that T >
1
n: otherwise,
P
i∈N wi < nT ≤ n ·
1
n = 1.
The analysis for the case
1
n ≤ T <
1
n−1 can be done in a similar
fashion, and is omitted for brevity.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider a WVG G with n ≥ 4, T ≥
1
n−1 and
m <
1
T − 1, with agents’ weights being given by: w1 = T −
δ,w2 = T −2δ,...wp−1 = T −(p−1)δ, and wp = 1−(p−1)T,
wp+1 = ... = wn =
p(p−1)δ
2(n−p) , where p ∈ argmin3≤q≤n−1{q|T ≥
1
q}, and δ > 0 is arbitrarily small.
Since m < p − 1, {1,p − 1} is an equilibrium winning coali-
tion that can be obtained with no delay of agreement (player p − 1
will accept from player 1 any offer of at least ε). On the other
hand, there is a winning coalition consisting of player p − 1 and a
(sufﬁciently small) subset of players i ≥ p + 1. Indeed, we have
p(p−1)
2 ≥ p − 1, implying wp−1 +
Pn
i=p+1 wi ≥ T). Hence,
PoD(B,G) ≥
2T−3δ
Copt >
2T−3δ
T+
p(p−1)δ
2(n−p)
− − →
δ→0 2.
However, one can argue that if T ≤ 1/2, the formation of a
single coalition is not the only possible outcome. Indeed, if there is
more than one task to fulﬁll, and the agents have enough resources
to handle multiple tasks, it is plausible (and, moreover, desirable
from the efﬁciency perspective) that multiple coalitions will form.
ThisscenarioisnotcapturedbythebargainingprocessofSection4,
or the analysis in this section. Therefore, in the next section we
discuss how to extend our approach to the multiple-tasks scenario.7. WEIGHTED VOTING GAMES WITH
MULTIPLE WINNING COALITIONS
In this section, we extend our discussion to deal with multiple win-
ning coalitions in WVGs. We focus on the scenario where there is
an a priori upper bound on the number of coalitions to be formed
(asopposedtoagentsformingcoalitionsuntilthetotalweightofthe
remaining agents is lower than T). This is a natural requirement in
many multiagent environments with a ﬁxed number of tasks.
We extend the bargaining procedure described in Section 4 to
this setting, and show that the resulting procedure also exhibits no
delay of agreement. That is, any round of bargaining results in
the formation of a winning coalition. We then discuss the price of
democracy in the context of multiple winning coalitions in WVGs.
7.1 Bargaining to Form Multiple Coalitions
Consider a weighted voting game G = (N;w;T) with N =
{1,...,n} and w1 ≥ ... ≥ wn. Suppose that there are d tasks to
be allocated, so, potentially, there can be d disjoint winning coali-
tions. That is, the set of admissible coalition structures consists of
all structures that contain at most d non-singleton coalitions. Given
G and d as above, a reservation cost ε, and m rounds, d ≤ m ≤ n,
we now deﬁne a bargaining process to form multiple coalitions
Bd(G,ε,d,m). Bd proceeds as follows.
We say that agent i is active in round r, 1 ≤ r ≤ m, if i has not
joined any of the coalitions formed in rounds 1,...,r −1. Let N
r
denote the set of active agents in round r and let P
r = {i ∈ N
r |
i has not proposed in rounds 1,...,r − 1} be the set of potential
proposers. In the rth round, agent j
r = min{i | i ∈ P
r} has to
propose a coalition C
r and a payoff vector p
r = (p
r
i)i∈Nr that
satisﬁes (i) p
r
i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
r, (ii)
P
i∈Nr p
r
i = v(C
r) and
(iii) p
r
i = 0 for all i 6∈ C
r. If j
r’s offer is accepted by all agents in
C
r, then C
r forms, and the set of active agents in the next round is
set to be N
r+1 = N
r \C
r. Otherwise the set of active agents does
not change, i.e., we have N
r+1 = N
r and P
r+1 = P
r \ {j
r}.
The process can terminate in less than m rounds if d coalitions
have been formed, or no more winning coalitions can form, i.e.,
w(N
r+1) < T.
7.2 No Delay of Agreement
Here we show that the bargaining procedure described in this sec-
tion shares many of the good qualities of B(G,ε,m). Speciﬁcally,
under the same assumptions as before, we prove the following re-
sults: (i) the Bd process has an efﬁciently computable SSPE, and
(ii) any SSPE of Bd exhibits no delay of agreement, i.e., the coali-
tion and the payoff division scheme proposed at each bargaining
round are accepted by all members of that coalition.
First we extend the notion of stationary strategy to this setting:
A strategy of player j
r (the proposer at round r) is stationary if,
given the set of currently active players N
r and the number of un-
completed tasks d
r(≤ d), the outcome j
r proposes in the rth round
is the same no matter what coalitions and payoff division schemes
were proposed by players whose proposals were rejected in rounds
1,...,r − 1. We say that an SPNE is stationary if the equilibrium
strategy of each player is stationary.
We now present the main result of this section:
THEOREM 3. The bargaining process Bd(G,ε,d,m) has an
SSPE. Moreover, in any SSPE there is no delay of agreement. Fi-
nally, suppose that for i = 1,...,n we can represent wi as wi =
w
0
i/W, where all w
0
is and W are integers. Then, an SSPE can be
computed in time poly(n,logW).
Proof Sketch: The proof is by induction (see Theorem 1 for d =
1), and uses the following idea. Suppose that the statement holds
for any game Bd0(G
0,ε,d
0,m
0) with d
0 ≤ d − 1, m
0 ≤ m, N
0 ⊆
N. If there is an SSPE in which the player 1’s (stationary) strategy
in the ﬁrst round, (C
1,p
1), is efﬁciently computable and accepted
by the members of C
1, then the winning coalition C
1 forms, and
we have to play a bargaining game Bd−1(G
0,ε,d
0 = d − 1,m
0 =
m − 1), where G
0 is given by G(N
0 = N \ C
1;w
˛
˛
N0;T), with
w
˛ ˛
N0 denoting the restriction of w to N
0. This game has all the
desirable properties, by inductive assumption. Therefore, it sufﬁces
to prove that there is an SSPE in which the ﬁrst winning coalition
forms in the ﬁrst round.
For that, the proof uses backwards induction as follows. Con-
sider the subgame that starts at round j and assume that no winning
coalition has formed so far. For any j = m,...,1, we inductively
construct a particular SSPE (s1,...,sn) of our process; at step j,
we specify the proposal that player j makes at this stage under sj
and argue that it can be computed within poly(n,logW) steps. Fur-
thermore, we show that in any SSPE, the proposal made by player
j in round j is accepted by all agents in the proposed coalition.
Applying the latter result with j = 1 implies that the ﬁrst coalition
forms in the ﬁrst round. 2
The result is extendable to the case with different reservation
costs, where they are either sufﬁciently small or non-decreasing.
We defer the related proofs to an extended version of the paper.
7.3 The PoD in the Multiple-Task Scenario
We can adapt our deﬁnition of the price of democracy to the setting
of WVGs with multiple tasks as follows:
PoD(G,B) =

+∞ if v(CSB) < vd
c(CSB)/cmin otherwise, (7)
wherevd = min{d,maxCS∈CSN v(CS)}andcmin = min{c(CS) |
v(CS) = vd}.
It turns out that the bargaining process Bd described above does
not always form the optimal number of winning coalitions, i.e.,
there are G, d such that PoD(G,Bd) = +∞. For example, con-
sider a WVG G with w = (T − 2δ,T − 3δ,3δ,δ,δ) for some
small enough δ and d = 2. We claim that for any m ≥ 2 and any
small enough ε we have PoD(G,B(G,ε,d,m)) = +∞. Indeed,
the optimal coalition stucture consists of two coalitions: namely,
{1,4,5} and {2,3}. Now, note that if in the ﬁrst round 1 invites 3
and offers him ε, 3 will accept: otherwise, in the next round 2 will
propose to 1, and the game will be over. Moreover, 1 prefers invit-
ing 3 to inviting 4 and 5, as this leaves him with a higher share of
payoffs. Hence, in the ﬁrst round {1,3} will form, thus precluding
formation of the optimal coalition structure.
Moreover, this issue is not unique to our bargaining process. In-
deed, for any negotiation process B with polynomially computable
strategies there is a game G such that PoD(G,B(G,ε,2,m)) =
+∞ for any m. To see this, consider a game G where weights cor-
respond to an instance of PARTITION, a classic NP-complete prob-
lem given by a list of numbers {a1,...,an} with
Pn
i=1 ai = 2K;
it is a “yes”-instance if there is a S ⊆ N such that
P
i∈S ai = K.
It is not hard to see that if PoD(G,B(G,ε,2,m)) < ∞ for any
such G, one can use B to solve PARTITION in polynomial time.
This result can be generalized to d > 2; due to space restrictions,
we omit the details.
One can show, however, that if the supply of resources exceeds
demand by at least a factor of 2, i.e., w(N) ≥ 2dT, then the price
of democracy is guaranteed to be ﬁnite (and, in fact, does not ex-
ceed2). Theprooffollowsimmediatelyfromournodelayofagree-
ment result and the fact that the weight of any coalition formed in
an equilibrium of Bd is at most 2T.8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper introduced the notion of the price of democracy (PoD),
an intuitive and conceptually appealing measure of the relative in-
efﬁciency of decentralized processes in forming coalitions to serve
tasks. After discussing several approaches to deﬁning the PoD, we
focused on one that prioritizes value over cost, by setting PoD =
+∞ if the coalition structure output by the coalition formation pro-
cess does not attain the maximal value, and to the ratio of the cost
of the coalition structure output by this process to that of the most
cost-effective coalition structure with maximal value otherwise.
To illustrate the applicability of this notion, we studied it in the
context of weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of
games that can be used to model resource allocation in multi-agent
domains. We approached the coalition formation process in such
games from a non-cooperative perspective, and presented an intu-
itive, multi-round coalitional bargaining process for such games.
We showed that this process exhibits several desirable properties:
there is no delay of agreement in equilibrium and the equilibrium
strategies of all agents are efﬁciently computable. To quantify the
price of democracy of this process, we instantiated our proposed
generic PoD metric for this class of games and showed a simple
upper bound of 2 for the PoD in a wide range of bargaining scenar-
ios, and a tight bound of 3/2 for our multi-round process (which,
moreover, cannot improve after two rounds of bargaining), when
the players’ reservation values are relatively small. We then dis-
cussed WVGs with multiple coalitions. We presented a generalized
version of our bargaining method for a variant of this setting with
a ﬁxed target number of winning coalitions and showed that it also
results in no delay of agreement. Finally, we argued that in this
scenario the PoD can be inﬁnite if there is no surplus of resources,
but having abundant resources allows us to bound the PoD by 2.
As weighted voting games are usually viewed as cooperative
games, one might think that it is more natural to deﬁne the price
of democracy in terms of solution concepts characteristic of coop-
erative games, such as, e.g., the core. In particular, one may want
to compare an outcome in the core to the most efﬁcient outcome.
However, this approach is problematic for several reasons. First,
the traditional deﬁnition of the core of the weighted voting games
presumes that the grand coalition will form, so comparing the core
outcomes to the optimal outcome is not very informative: the price
of democracy will be simply the inverse of the weight of the op-
timal coalition. Second, the core of a weighted voting game can
be empty; in fact, it is empty whenever there are no veto agents, a
situation that is not unusual for this class of games. These issues
can be mitigated somewhat by allowing for coalition structures, as
donein[7], wherethecoreforWVGswithcoalitionstructures(CS-
core) is introduced. However, the CS-core may still be empty—
and, moreover, it is NP-hard to check whether a given outcome is
in the CS-core or to generate an outcome in the CS-core [7]. For
these reasons, we choose not to take this route.
In terms of future work, we intend to explore the PoD for classes
of games other than WVGs. Indeed, the PoD notion is conceptu-
ally appealing and provides a useful tool for the analysis of any
kind of coalitional games that involve resource allocation, such as,
e.g., min-cost spanning tree [3] or network ﬂow games [9]. Also,
we intend to study the relationship between the number of rounds
and the quality of the outcome in other multi-round bargaining pro-
cesses. Indeed, our paper illustrates that, even though there is no
delay of agreement, having two rounds of bargaining rather than
one can improve the outcome considerably, whereas adding more
rounds has no effects on the outcome quality. Given this, it would
be interesting to see if the same phenomenon occurs in a wider
range of settings. In a still broader context, quantifying the rela-
tionship between repeated or extensive-form games’ outcomes and
their respective optimal centralized solutions, is an interesting re-
search topic that has received little attention in the existing litera-
ture. We intend to work towards ﬁlling this gap.
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